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The Doctrine of Implied Ratification-
Application and Limitations
ELLIOT AXELROD*
The basic import of the doctrine of implied ratification is that a
principal may be held liable for the unauthorized acts of his agent, not
because of his subsequent willingness to be bound but rather because
his conduct and actions are inconsistent with a disavowal of the
agent's acts. Inasmuch as most transactions involve agents, it is vital
for lawyers and potential litigants to fully understand this doctrine,
particularly the situations in which courts will impose or limit its
application.'
Although the law of agency necessarily draws upon principles from
other areas of law,2 many of its concepts are unique. The doctrine of
implied ratification presents perhaps the most original combination of
nontraditional reasoning and rules in the law of agency.' This, com-
© 1983 Elliot Axelrod
* B.S., New York University; J.D., New York Law School. Associate Professor of Law,
Baruch College, City University of New York. Member, New York State Bar.-Ed.
1. See W. SEAVEY, AGENCY (1964). Professor Seavey, one of the foremost writers on the
law of agency, commented in the preface of his treatise that "the time given [to the study of
agency in law schools] is far less than its intrinsic importance warrants, since practically all of
the world's business involves agents and in most important transactions, an agent on each side."
Id. at ix.
2. Agency theory draws primarily on the law of torts, contracts (including conveyances),
sales and negotiable instruments, trusts and restitution.
3. See Twerski, The Independent Doctrine of Ratification v. The Restatement and Mr.
Seavey, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1968) Professor Twerski states:
An examination of the ratification doctrine has led this writer to conclude that it
merits independent recognition as a viable agency concept. The failure to recognize
its independent significance has unfortunately led to its misapprehension and
misapplication and has caused needless confusion to generations of students who
have sought to reconcile ratification with traditional common law rules.
Id. at 4. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 comment c (1957), which provides in
pertinent part:
[Ratification] does not conform to the rules of contracts, since it can be ac-
complished without consideration to or manifestation by the purported principal
and without fresh consent by the other party. Further, it operates as if the transac-
tion were complete at the time and place of the first event, rather than the last, as
in the normal case of offer and acceptance. It does not conform to the rules of
torts, since the ratifier may become responsible for a harm which was not caused
by him, his property or his agent. It cannot be justified on a theory of restitution,
since the ratifier may not have received a benefit, nor the third person a depriva-
tion. Nor is ratification dependent upon a doctrine of estoppel, since there may be
ratification although neither the agent nor the other party suffer a loss resulting
from a statement of affirmance or a failure to disavow.
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bined with the diversity of situations in which agency relationships
arise, makes prediction of how a court will apply this doctrine dif-
ficult.
This article will investigate the doctrine of implied ratification, with
an emphasis on determining which conduct by a principal may lead to
imposition of liability. The goal is twofold: to achieve a clearer
understanding of the current judicial application and limitations of the
rules, and to provide guidelines for a principal who wishes to protect
himself from liability for his agent's unauthorized acts.
Fundamentals
Ratification is based on the premise that when a party consents to
another's actions on his behalf, he can acquire rights and liabilities
based on such conduct. Further, the consent may be given after the act
with the same efficacy as consent given prior to an act.' The Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency defines ratification as: "the affirmance by a
person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done or
professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all
persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him." 5
The doctrine of ratification may be divided into two distinct
categories, express and implied. Express ratification occurs when the
principal voluntarily becomes a party to the j~rior act or transaction
done or purported to be done on his account.6 The principal's consent,
in an express ratification, normally manifests itself orally or in
writing.7 This has also been described as voluntary ratification, "since
the affirmance of the transaction results from the willingness of the
ratifier to become a party to the transaction and is not imposed upon
him because of what he does or fails to do." 8 In the event that for-
malities are required for the authorization of a particular transaction,
the same formalities are required for its ratification.9
Before considering implied ratification, some basic tenets of ratifica-
tion should be kept in mind. The principal must have possessed the
4. Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 3d 67, 500 P.2d 1401, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972). See
SEAVEY, supra note 1, at 57. See also Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859 (1920).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1957).
6. Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 3d 67, 500 P.2d 1401, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972);
Rayonier, Inc. v. Polson, 400 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1968).
7. The affirmance resulting in ratification is basically a mental act. SEAVEY, supra note 1, at
§ 37 (It is "a determination to abide by, or to adopt as one's own, the act of another.").
8. Seavey, Ratification By Silence, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 30 (1954).
9. For example, a seal or writing may be required for a valid authorization to convey land
or strict compliance with statutory provisions may be required before an agreement made by





power to have authorized the act when it occurred.10 The Restatement
goes further, allowing ratification if, at the time of affirmance, the in-
tended principal could authorize such an act." The principal must
have full knowledge of all of the material facts at the time of ratifica-
tion.'" However, if a principal ratifies and is aware that he does not
know all of the relevant facts, he may lose his right to avoid the
ratification.'3 Moreover, he may be estopped from avoiding ratifica-
tion by a change in position by the other party. '" A principal may not
ratify a transaction that, under law or public policy, is illegal."
There are also various facts and events closely associated with an
unauthorized transaction that are neither required for, nor prevent, an
effective ratification.'6 For example, the agent's or the third party's
knowledge that the agent was in fact unauthorized is irrelevant.'7
However, in a controversial case, Hirzel Funeral Homes v. Equitable
10. See SEAVEY, supra note 1, at § 33.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 84(1) (1957). Ordinarily, an agent may not ratify
his own unauthorized act. However, under the Restatement (Second):
An agent can be authorized to ratify for his principal the previous unauthorized
act of himself or of another agent. Prima facie, an agent authorized to delegate to
another the performance of a transaction or to effect a result is authorized to
ratify the unauthorized performance of the transaction or accomplishment of a
result by such other ....
Id. § 93 comment c (1957).
12. Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916, 103 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972); Griggs v.
Dodson, 223 Ga. 164, 154 S.E.2d 252 (1967); Security Ins. Co. v. Mato, 13 Ill. App. 3d 11, 298
N.E.2d 725 (1973); Desilvo v. Restauire, 264 Pa. Super. 522, 400 A.2d 211 (1979).
13. See SEAVEY, supra note 1, at § 36. Ignorance of minor details will not prevent affirmance
constituting ratification on the grounds of not knowing all of the relevant facts. Id. § 36D. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 91 (1957).
14. See SEAVEY, supra note I, at § 36E.
15. Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974). See also Note, Agency-Ratifica-
tion of an Unauthorized Act, 19 S.C.L. REv. 788, 790 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note], citing
Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E.2d 8 (1951).
16. These are set forth in § 92 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957), as follows:
An affirmance by the principal of a transaction with a third person is not
prevented from resulting in ratification by the fact:
(a) that the other does not give fresh consent to the transaction at or after the
affirmance, or does not change his position because of it; or
(b) that the purported principal, before affirming, had repudiated the transac-
tion, if the other party has not acted or has failed to act in reliance upon the
repudiation; or
(c) that the other party had a cause of action against the agent because of a
breach of warranty or a misrepresentation by the agent as to his authority to con-
duct the original transaction; or
(d) that the agent conducting the transaction has died or lost capacity; or
(e) that the principal is subject to liability without receiving consideration; or
(f) that the agent or the other party knew the agent to be unauthorized; or
(g) that the principal does not communicate with anyone.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 92(f) (1957).
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Trust Co.,',8 the court held that there could be no ratification if the
third party to the contract knew that the purported agent was not
authorized. ' 9
Implied ratification is based on conduct of the principal inconsistent
with any position other than an affirmation of the agent's act or trans-
action.2" Professor Seavey commented: "Ratification is implied in
order to deny the principal an advantageous position over the third
person contractor. Absent implied ratification, the principal, after dis-
covering the execution of the unauthorized act, could either ratify or
reject depending on whether the transaction subsequently resulted in
profit or loss."21 In an implied ratification, the ratifier is in essence
electing to do acts from which a court will impose liability upon him.
Conduct, rather than consent, is the critical factor.2 In addition, for-
malities required for the protection of the ratifier in voluntary transac-
tions are unnecessary.3 If, however, the formality is required for the
protection of others, it remains a requirement for implied ratification."
Retention of Benefits
One kind of conduct that leads to implied ratification is retention of
benefits, that is, when a principal receives or retains property or
benefits as a result of an unauthorized transaction conducted by his
agent and thereafter fails to notify either the third person or the agent
of his disapproval. In these situations, ratification results automati-
cally without reference to the principal's desires.2 The majority view is
that failure to repudiate within a reasonable time coupled with a
failure to return what was received is ratification and not merely
evidence of ratification.26
18. 46 Del. 334, 83 A.2d 700 (1951).
19. Id. For two cogent opposing views on the reasoning of Hirzel, see Seavey, Ratifica-
lion-Purporting to Act as Agent, 21 U. CHti. L. REV. 248 (1954) and Twerski, supra note 3, at
8-13.
20. Carolina-Georgia Carpet & Textiles, Inc. v. Pelloni, 370 So. 2d 450 (Fla. App. 1979). See
Note, supra note 15, at 788 ("The inconsistent conduct is viewed by the courts as manifesting an
affirmation of the transaction.").
21. Note, supra note 15, at 788.
22. Seavey points out that since the liability results from conduct, any declarations by the
principal of his unwillingness to be bound by the transaction would have no effect on the result.
SEAVEY, supra note 1, at § 38. See also George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co.,
12 111. App. 362, 299 N.E.2d 601 (1973).
23. SEAVEY, supra note 1, at § 38B ("One who brings suit upon a contract to sell land made
by an agent not authorized in writing, or who receives and retains the proceeds, cannot well set
up the lack of a written authorization.").
24. Id. at § 37H and cases cited in notes 91, 92 and 93 therein.
25. Seavey, Ratification By Silence, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 30, 40 (1954).
26. Id. at 40, 41 n.46 (citing cases). Seavey comments that these cases are based in restitu-
tion. He explains:




Retention of the benefits of an unauthorized transaction by an agent
will not be held to constitute ratification unless the principal has the
privilege of repudiating the unauthorized act.27 In Wing v. Lederer2" a
licensed tree surgeon performed certain work for a homeowner. The
work was authorized by the homeowner's part-time caretaker and
yardman, but the caretaker clearly had no authority, actual or ap-
parent, to authorize it.29 The tree surgeon contended that the
homeowner ratified the acts of the defendant's agent in hiring the
plaintiff by accepting the work and retaining the benefits thereof.30 On
appeal the court held that no ratification took place because the home-
owner had no choice regarding the retention of the benefits and did
not have the privilege of repudiating the act.31
Independent Claim Defense
Sometimes a principal may retain the benefits of his agent's
unauthorized transaction after denying ratification of the transaction
by asserting an independent claim to those benefits. The recent case of
Carpenter v. Payette Valley Cooperative, Inc. addressed this issue.32 A
lender loaned $20,000 to a dairy farmer belonging to the defendant
cooperative. The lender alleged that he was induced to make the loan
by the guaranty of the cooperative through its manager. When the
cooperative learned of the guaranty, it immediately disavowed the
transaction by letter, denying any previous knowledge of and respon-
sibility for the unauthorized guaranty.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the agent had neither express
nor apparent authority to act as agent for the defendant in guarantee-
ing the farmer's personal note.33 The court stated: "[N]o liability
could attach to the [cooperative] by reason of the endorsement of the
another who purported to act for him is responsible to the owner of the property if
nothing more happens, and the third person at that moment is entitled to a rescis-
sion of the transaction with the purported agent and the restitution to him of the
subject matter. The principal, therefore, has a duty to return the property to the
owner and if upon demand he refuses to return it, assuming it to be a chattel, he
would be guilty of conversion and the third person would be entitled to an action
for the restitution of the property or its value.
Id. Although the principle of unjust enrichment may primarily motivate the decisions, the
language most often is that of ratification and sometimes the relief granted is not restitutionary.
27. Wing v. Lederer, 77 I1. App. 2d 413, 418, 222 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1966) ("Absent such
choice, the principal's conduct in accepting such benefits does not indicate that he assents to
what has been done or intends to confirm it.").
28. Id.
29. Id. at 417, 222 N.E.2d at 537.
30. Id. at 418, 222 N.E.2d at 538.
31. Id. Plaintiff's alternate theories of an implied contract and/or quasi-contract also failed.
Id. at 419-20, 222 N.E.2d at 539.
32. 99 Idaho 143, 578 P.2d 1074 (1978).
33. Id. at 147, 578 P.2d at 1078.
1983]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
note by [its agent] because he was at all times acting beyond the scope
of his employment and without the knowledge, consent or authority of
the cooperative's directors."3 ' The court reiterated the basic agency
principle that a person dealing with an agent must ascertain the extent
of his authority from the principal.35
The lender also argued that the cooperative had impliedly ratified
the transaction by retaining the benefits thereof. The plaintiff argued
that the cooperative was enriched because some of the loan proceeds
discharged part of the farmer's indebtedness to it and the balance went
to pay for the farmer's purchase of cattle, which the cooperative
subsequently sold on foreclosure. The court followed the Restatement
(Second) of Agency and held that application of the loan proceeds did
not constitute an implied ratification:
The receipt by a purported principal, with knowledge of the facts,
of something to which he would not be entitled unless an act pur-
ported to be done for him were affirmed, and to which he makes
no claim except through such act, c6nstitutes an affirmance unless
at the time of such receipt he repudiates the act. If he repudiates
the act, his receipt of benefits constitutes an affirmance at the
election of the other party to the transaction.6
The court believed that the crucial consideration was whether the
cooperative had a claim to the benefits received independent of its
agent's unauthorized transaction.7 Its conclusion was that the
cooperative had the independent right to receive money owed to it and
therefore did not act inconsistently by retaining the funds and
34. Id. at 145, 578 P.2d at 1076. The court relied on the following factual findings: (1) The
Board of Directors exercised strict control over its agent in financial matters. The agent was
authorized by resolution or minutes to conduct financial business only with certain designated
financial institutions of which plaintiff was not included. (2) The agent was never authorized by
the defendant to endorse the note held by the plaintiff. And, (3) the defendant had not ap-
parently or ostensibly or otherwise held out its agent as having authority and was not estopped
from showing his lack of authority to endorse the note. Id. at 145-46, 578 P.2d at 1076-77.
35. The court stated:
[A third party] cannot rely upon the agent's statement or assumption of authority,
or upon the mere presumption of authority. [Citation omitted.] If such person
makes no inquiry but chooses to rely upon the agent's statement he is chargeable
with knowledge of the agent's authority, and his ignorance of its extent will be no
excuse to him, and the fault cannot be thrown upon the principal who never
authorized the act or contract.
Id. at 146, 578 P.2d at 1077 (quoting Chamberlin v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604,
612, 247 P. 12, 14 (1926)).
36. Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 148, 578 P.2d 1074, 1079 (1978)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 98 (1957)).




repudiating the unauthorized act of its agent.3" The court said that "a
party who claims to have benefited a principal by reason of the
unauthorized action of an agent has the burden of proving that the
benefits accrue directly to the principal as the proximate result of the
unauthorized transaction in order to constitute ratification by the
principal." 9
The court also held that there was no implied ratification by reten-
tion of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. Since the lender failed to
perfect a security interest in the cattle and should have known that the
cooperative held a chattel mortgage with an after-acquired property
provision, the lender had only his promissory note to look to for the
return of his loan.
40
In De Silvo v. Restauire,4' a conversion of goods gave rise to an in-
dependent claim to defeat what otherwise would be an implied ratifica-
tion by retention of the benefits. An automobile buyer brought an ac-
tion to compel the transfer of title of the car. The title was held by a
credit corporation. The buyer acquired the automobile as a result of
several transactions originating with the lessee of the automobile who,
38. Id. at 149, 578 P.2d at 1080. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 98, comment
c (1957) which states in pertinent part:
If the purported principal is otherwise entitled to possession of the things received
as the result of the agent's act, his receipt of them does not constitute affirmance,
although in connection with other facts it may be evidence of it. Likewise, if the
principal believes himself to be entitled to the things independently of the act of
the purported agent, the fact that he knows of the material facts connected with
the transaction as conducted by the agent does not necessarily cause his receipt of
the things to constitute an affirmance.
See also T.W. & L.O. Naylor Co. v. Bowman, 39 Idaho 764, 230 P. 347 (1924); cited in
Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 578 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1978).
39. Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 149, 578 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1978).
See also Killinger v. lest, 91 Idaho 571, 576, 428 P.2d 490, 495 (1967). But see Carpenter, 99
Idaho at 151, 578 P.2d at 1082, (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Shepard, while
acknowledging the "independent claim" principle, applies a different and cogent interpretation
to the facts at hand:
The money was given to the [defendant] as a convenient way of getting the money
to Browne. The fact that the [defendant] set-off the debt owed to it by Browne
when it received the money from [the plaintiff] on Browne's account does not
mean, vis-a-vis [the plaintiff], that the [defendant] had an independent right to the
money it obtained from [the plaintiff]. Having acquired control of the money from
[the plaintiff] solely by reason of the unauthorized acts of its agent Collinsworth,
an effective repudiation of those unauthorized acts required not merely a notice of
repudiation but a return of the benefits acquired by those acts. Failure to return
that money constitutes an affirmance of the agent's acts, notwithstanding notice of
repudiation. (Emphasis added.)
See also Hammitt v. Virginia Mining Co., 32 Idaho 245, 181 P. 336 (1919).
40. Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 150, 578 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1978).
41. 264 Pa. Super. 528, 400 A.2d 211 (1979).
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by the terms of his lease, had no right to purchase or sell the car.
Later, the buyer was told by the agent that the original lessee had no
authority to sell the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, when the. buyer
remitted payment to the credit corporation's agent, the agent refused
to transfer title but accepted the check and applied it to the original
lessee's account, which at the time was paid in full. According to the
buyer, the lessor had no independent claim because the account was
up to date. However, the court held that there was no ratification in-
asmuch as the lessee's admitted conversion of the automobile was a
default of the lease entitling the credit corporation to accelerate the
lease obligations. Since the accelerated balance due exceeded the
amount of payment, the acceptance of the check partially satisfied the
independent claim and "could not work a legal ratification ....
On occasion, even the existence of an independent claim or other
legitimate reason for a course of conduct may not prevent that con-
duct from constituting a ratification of another's unauthorized and
even gratuitous act. In Adams v. KVWO, Inc. ,4 on the termination of
a personal property lease agreement, the lessee, radio station KVWO,
had the property moved and placed in storage at its expense. The
rightful owner had been asked to remove the property many times.
Adams, who held a secured claim on the property, took possession of
one item of the property (an office filing cabinet) from storage and
paid all of the storage charges on it, signing a receipt as "owner or
authorized agent." The court held that by this act, Adams ratified not
only the accruing unpaid storage charges but the initial moving and
storage charges, which had been paid by KVWO.4 4 It is important to
note that at the time the property was moved into storage by KVWO,
Adams did not have legal title, but only a valid security interest.4 The
court, in holding Adams liable to KVWO for the initial moving and
storage charges, reasoned that Adams's security interest in the
property "was the only real interest of any value then embodied by the
[property] and was unquestionably protected by KVWO's action."
'4 6
The court further said: "Even though this protection by storage may
well have been initiated by a legally unfavored 'volunteer', ... Adams,
through his actions,... ratified this 'voluntary' protection. ' 47
42. Id. at 534, 400 A.2d at 214. The court relied primarily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 98 (1957), appearing in the text at note 37, and also on Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted
Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192 (1952); Gum, Inc. v. Felten, 341 Pa. 96, 17 A.2d 386 (1941).
43. 570 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 1977).
44. Id. at 461-62 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 460 (the lease had been terminated by a bankruptcy trustee and legal title passed by
the bankruptcy court's order long after the property was stored).






The consequences of how and when a principal chooses to disavow
an unauthorized act of his agent on learning of the act must be care-
fully considered to avoid an implied though unintended ratification. In
Minniti v. Cascade Employers Ass'n, Inc.," a corporate defendant,
when informed of an unauthorized employment contract entered into
by its agent with the plaintiff, chose to disavow the contract by a letter
to the plaintiff which read, in pertinent part, that the contract "'shall
be terminated in accordance with the terms set forth in the agreement
in connection with the cancellation of the agreement'. . ."9 The
plaintiff contended that the letter constituted a ratification of the
agreement because the employer had relied on its terms for cancella-
tion. Although the court held that there was no ratification, it implied
that had the defendant not acted promptly in its conduct to disavow
and terminate the contract, an implied ratification could be based on
such conduct.50
In a recent Illinois case,5 an employee had been promised a salary
increase by the employer's agent at the time he was hired.52 After a
two-month delay, this promise was disavowed by the defendant as
being an unauthorized act. The court held that "mere delay" in telling
the plaintiff that the promise was unauthorized and consequently
would not be honored did not establish a ratification of the
unauthorized act." Regrettably, the court did not provide any quan-
titative limits on the extent of such a "delay." Clearly a delay beyond
a reasonable time could constitute an implied ratification by silence.54
Additionally, the court did not accept the employee's contention that
48. 280 Or. 319, 570 P.2d 1171 (1977).
49. Id. at 324, 570 P.2d at 1174.
50. Id. at 332, 570 P.2d at 1178.
51. Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 84 111. App. 3d 1132, 405 N.E.2d 1076 (1980).
52. Id. at 1137, 405 N.E.2d at 1080-81. (The court held that the agent had no actual authori-
ty for this act and that the employee could not have reasonably believed the agent (an interviewer
in charge of recruiting) had authority. The court reached this result because the employee's ini-
tial contact with the employer was with its placement department where he had his first inter-
view; the interviewer was not at a management level and his job title did not suggest otherwise;
and the interviewer told the employee that the formal offer of employment would be made by
the placement department).
53. Id. at 1138-39, 405 N.E.2d at 1082. See also Wing v. Lederer, 77 I11. App. 2d 413, 222
N.E.2d 535 (1966), discused supra in the text accompanying notes 28-31.
54. Professor Seavey, in discussing the probative value of silence, states:
[A] person's failure to repudiate a prior transaction in which his . . . name is in-
volved has probative value to indicate his assent is consistent with, and limited by,
the generalization that a failure to take action is evidence of a state of mind
wherever the situation is such that action would have been taken by the ordinary
person who did not have such a state of mind.
Seavey, Ratification by Silence, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 30, 32 (1954).
1983]
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his employment constituted a "retained benefit" to the employer
resulting in an implied ratification. The court noted that the agent did
have express authority to interview and recommend the employee for
employment and, therefore, "any benefit sought or retained by the
[employer] in relation to [the employee's] employment is irrelevant to
the possibility of ratification of the promise for the . . . salary in-
crease."55
Basing a Lawsuit or Defense
Another major category of conduct leading to an implied ratifica-
tion is the basing of a lawsuit or a defense on an unauthorized transac-
tion, with knowledge of its terms and conditions.5 6 The Restatement
(Second) of Agency provides:
There is affirmance if the purported principal, with knowledge of
the facts, in an action in which the third person or the purported
agent is an adverse party:
(a) brings suit to enforce promises which were part of the unau-
thorized transaction or to secure interests which were the fruit of
such transaction and to which he would be entitled only if the act
had been authorized; or
(b) bases a defense upon the unauthorized transaction as though
it were authorized; or
(c) continues to maintain such suit or base of such defense.7
Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co.58 presents an
interesting example of this category of conduct, as well as its relation
to matters of pleading. The case arose from a transaction in which
Wren Mobile Homes was acting as the alleged agent of Midland-
Guardian Company. Midland was the holder of a title retention con-
tract providing for payment in installments of the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of a house trailer. Upon the buyer's default,
Midland instructed Wren to repossess the house trailer. The buyer
sued Midland and Wren as codefendants for damages arising during
the repossession. At the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
buyer and was paid entirely by Midland." Midland subsequently
55. Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 84 111. App. 3d 1132, 1139, 405 N.E.2d 1076,
1082 (1980).
56. See SEAVEY, supra note I, at § 38D and cases cited therein. ("One cannot at one time
blow both hot and cold; claim validity for a transaction and at the same time deny it.").
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 97 (1957).
58. 117 Ga. App. 22, 159 S.E.2d 734 (1967).
59. Id. at 24, 159 S.E.2d at 736-37. After defensive pleadings were filed, the buyer settled




brought suit against its agent Wren for reimbursement of its loss as the
result of the previous litigation. Wren contended that Midland had
ratified Wren's alleged wrongful acts and therefore, as a matter of
law, could not withdraw the ratification and obtain reimbursement.
60
In Midland's answer in the previous case, it had denied the buyer's
allegations that acts of its agent, Wren, were wrongful. The court held
in favor of Midland, reasoning that basing a defense "requires the
adoption of an agent's action in an affirmative fashion such as basing
an affirmative defense thereon."' 6' The court said that "denying
allegations that a plaintiff is compelled to sustain with proof is not
basing an affirmative defense on the alleged wrongful acts, but is
rather to require proof thereof by the plaintiff. There is a distinction
between 'denial' and an affirmative 'defense'."162 The court further
commented that "the denial of an allegation is not an affirmative
declaration that the allegation is not true, but simply puts the plaintiff
on notice that the burden is upon him to prove the allegation."
'63
In Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros. ,64 a buyer brought
suit to enforce an arbitration clause in the sales contract. The seller
alleged that its agent had no authority to bind it to arbitration. The
court held that the seller's participation in arbitration initiated by the
buyer constituted a ratification of the clause despite the seller's prompt
withdrawal from arbitration.65 It should be noted, however, that the
bringing of a lawsuit or the setting up of a defense based on a transac-
tion as the agent was authorized to conduct it, probably would not
ratify the unauthorized transaction.
66
Pattern of Conduct
Delay in seeking reformation, even for reasons of financial
exigency, may defeat a principal's right to base a defense on an
to Wren did not bar proceedings against Midland (the principal) by the buyer, even though the
principal's liability was derivative (based on respondeat superior). The covenant merely ex-
tinguished the right to pursue the remedy against the covenantee but did not extinguish the
covenantor's cause of action. Otis v. Wren Mobile Homes, Inc., Ill Ga. App. 649, 143 So. 2d 8
(1966).
60. Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co., 117 Ga. App. 22, 25, 159 S.E.2d
734, 737 (1967) ("[Als between the principal and the agent, where the principal ratifies the
unauthorized actions of his agent he thereby absolves the agent from all responsibility for loss or
injury growing out of the unauthorized acts ....").
61. Id. at 27, 159 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 27-28, 159 S.E.2d at 738.
64. 258 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1977).
65. The court based its decision on the silence of the defendant as conduct indicating
ratification. Id. at 324-25.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 97, comment c (1957).
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unauthorized act. In Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook,67 a contractor
appealed from a decree of foreclosure on a real estate mortgage secur-
ing an indebtedness due and owing to the lender. The contractor had
signed a blank note and mortgage, which was delivered to the lender's
agent with the understanding that a twenty-year- loan commitment
would be forthcoming. Instead, the lender's agent filled in the note to
reflect a one-year loan commitment. In order to continue the construc-
tion project, the contractor subsequently executed four short-term
renewal notes, each granting an extension of time for payment. Upon
foreclosure for nonpayment, the contractor contended that the
lender's agent had no authority to fill in the note as he did. The court
affirmed the decree of foreclosure, holding that the contractor's ex-
ecution of four extensions of the original note after learning of the
actual term of payment constituted a ratification of the original note.68
In a recent Louisiana case,69 the defendant leased an air compressor
from the plaintiff for use in defendant's construction business. The
defendant ordered the equipment by telephone through its general
manager who specified the date and job site for delivery. Upon de-
livery of the equipment, the plaintiff required the signing of a "rental
dray receipt" by the defendant's construction foreman. Immediately
above the signature line the receipt contained a printed provision that
read in pertinent part, "you are to be responsible for any loss, damage
or breakage ... while the equipment is in your possession, and to save
us harmless from all claims arising therefrom."7 The equipment was
subsequently stolen from the defendant's construction site. The trial
court held that the defendant was not liable for the loss of the equip-
ment inasmuch as its foreman, though authorized to sign the dray
receipt acknowledging delivery of the rented equipment, had no au-
thority to bind the defendant for loss of the equipment.7 The ap-
pellate court, in reversing, held that the defendant's prior "pattern of
conduct"72 in its series of rental transactions with the plaintiff consti-
tuted an implied ratification of the action of its foreman. The evidence
established that on many earlier occasions the defendant had honored
invoices submitted by the plaintiff containing an identical provision
and signed by the defendant's foreman and that the defendant was
67. 25 Utah 2d 194, 479 P.2d 348 (1971).
68. Id. at 198, 479 P.2d at 351.
69. Southern States Equip. Co. v. Jack Legett Co., 379 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 1980).
70. Id. at 883.
71. Id. at 884. Additionally, the trial court held that the defendant, having used reasonable





aware of the liability statement. The court said, "Once defendant
learned of [the liability statement] by his continued silence and failure
to protest or object to its inclusion in the dray receipt, it tacitly con-
sented thereto and cannot now be heard to repudiate its legal effect.
' 7 3
Allegations of implied ratification, either as the basis for a lawsuit
or a defense, continue to be made in a wide variety of cases.74 Two
cases illustrate further limitations imposed by courts upon the applica-
tion of this doctrine. In a 1981 Illinois case," a dispute arose between
a buyer and a seller of real estate. The buyer claimed that the sale in-
cluded a warranty from the seller that there were no building code
violations onthe property. The written sales contract was never signed
by the seller and the property was conveyed by a warranty deed. The
buyer claimed that the warranty was agreed to by the parties' attorneys
and was therefore part of the transaction. The court rejected the
buyer's argument that the conveyance of the property by deed, cou-
pled with the seller's failure to inform the buyer that the seller had not
signed the contract of sale, was an implied ratification of oral terms
agreed to by the parties' attorneys.76
In the other case,77 the manager for a seller of office computers
rendered to a buyer the unauthorized service of preparing computer
programs. When the seller learned of his agent's acts, he nevertheless
told the agent to "finish up" solving the buyer's remaining complaints
about the computer. This conduct by the seller was claimed by the
buyer to be an implied ratification of the agent's program preparation
service, making the seller liable therefore and precluding the seller
from asserting defective programs as a defense to the buyer's breach
of warranty claim. In rejecting this reasoning, the court held that the
seller's conduct was simply the most expedient means of resolving the
buyer's general problems with the computer and was not conduct that
would imply a ratification of the agent's unauthorized acts.78
73. Id.
74. See Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd
mem., 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982); Phoenix Western Holding Corp. v. Gleeson, 18 Ariz. App.
60, 500 P.2d 320 (1972); Carolina-Georgia Carpet & Textiles, Inc. v. Pelloni, 370 So. 2d 450
(Fla. App. 1979); Theis v. DuPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., 212 Kan. 301, 510 P.2d 1212 (1973);
Monti v. Tangora, 99 Ill. App. 3d 575, 425 N.E.2d 597 (1981).
75. Monti v. Tangora, 99 Il. App. 3d 575, 425 N.E.2d 597 (1981).
76. Id. at 580, 425 N.E.2d at 601.
77. Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd
mem., 681 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 775. It should be noted that the court's discussion of the ratification issue was
somewhat hypothetical because the agent did not purport to act for the seller and the buyer did
not believe he was acting on behalf of the seller. In fact, the buyer helped the agent to conceal it
from the seller. Id. at 775. But see Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 25 Utah 2d 194, 479 P.2d
348 (1971) (pragmatic conduct no rebuttal to a claim of implied ratification).
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Conclusion
Implied ratification, which is based upon the conduct of the prin-
cipal, does not require the principal's willingness to be bound and,
indeed, in many instances will be imposed by courts notwithstanding a
subsequent contrary intention of the principal.7 9 It is vital, therefore,
to comprehend current judicial attitudes toward the application and
limitation of this doctrine.
An implied ratification will generally result when a principal retains
the benefits of his agent's unauthorized transaction, knowing of the
transaction.0 It will not result if the principal has not had the oppor-
tunity to repudiate the unauthorized actI' or if the principal has an in-
dependent claim to the benefits.2 Delay in repudiating an agent's
unauthorized act may also result in an implied ratification. 3
Basing a lawsuit or a defense on allegedly unauthorized acts is con-
duct of implied ratification, but the defense must be affirmative.
4
Also, the bringing of a lawsuit or the setting up of a defense based on
a transaction as the agent was authorized to conduct it does not im-
pliedly ratify that agent's unauthorized act.8"
A principal must be aware of the legal import of his course of con-
duct. Financial or other exigencies will not excuse a course of conduct
that otherwise indicates a legal implied ratification. 6 However, courts
continue to exercise restraint in the application of this doctrine.7
A principal wishing to avoid liability for his agent's unauthorized
acts should in all cases act swiftly and decisively in repudiation and, to
the extent possible, avoid conduct that might be construed as a reten-
tion of the benefits of an unauthorized act. Further protection will
result from a continuing scrutiny of future judicial application of the
doctrine.
79. See supra notes 20-24. See also Southern States Equip. Co. v. Jack Legett Co., 379 So.
2d 881 (La. App. 1980); Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 25 Utah 2d 194, 479 P.2d 348 (1971);
Adams v. KVWO, Inc., 570 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 1977).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 24-48.
81. See Wing v. Lederer, 77 I11. App. 2d 413, 222 N.E.2d 535 (1966) and discussion supra in
the text accompanying notes 27-32.
82. See Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 578 P.2d 1074 (1978) and
discussion thereof supra in text accompanying notes 33:41; De Silvo v. Restauire, 264 Pa. Super.
528, 400 A.2d 211 (1979) and discussion thereof supra in text accompanying notes 42-43.
83. See Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 84 111. App. 3d 1132, 405 N.E.2d 1076
(1980); Minniti v. Cascade Employers Assoc., Inc., 280 Or. 319, 570 P.2d 1171 (1977). See supra
text accompanying notes 49-55.
84. Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co., 117 Ga. App. 22, 159 S.E.2d 734
(1967). See generally supra notes 56-63.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 97, comment c (1957).
86. Southern States Equip. Co. v. Jack Legett Co., 379 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 1980). See
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 25 Utah 2d 194, 479 P.2d 348 (1971).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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